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Abstract: While substantial research finds that financial development boosts overall 
economic growth, we study whether financial development is pro-poor: Does financial 
development disproportionately raise the income of the poor?  Using a broad cross-
country sample, we find that the answer is yes: Financial intermediary development 
reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the income of the poor and 
therefore reduces poverty. This result is robust to controlling for simultaneity bias and 
reverse causation.  
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Stunningly high levels of poverty and income inequality characterize much of the 
world.  In 1998, 1.2 billion people lived worldwide on less than $400 per annum.   
During the 1990s, the poorest 20% of the population in the average country received less 
than 6% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  While previous cross-country 
research has shown that the poor gain as much from economic growth as the remainder of 
the population (Dollar and Kraay, 2002) and that growth in average income accounts for 
the largest share of the reduction in poverty over the last decades (Kraay, 2003), case 
studies indicate that the linkages among growth, poverty, and income distribution are 
complex (Ferreira and Paes de Barros, 1998).  Besley and Burgess (2003), Bourguignon 
(2004) and Ravallion (2001) illustrate the relationships between poverty, growth and 
inequality, providing examples of how both growth and inequality changes influence 
poverty. 
Besley and Burgesss (2003) calculate that a GDP per capita growth rate of 3.8% 
in developing countries would be required to achieve the Millennium Development Goal 
of cutting poverty by half by 2015; which is more than double the actual growth rate over 
the period 1960 to 1990. These same authors also argue that a one standard deviation 
decline in inequality would cut poverty by almost half in Latin America and by more than 
half in Sub-Saharan Africa. These calculations illustrate that both aggregate growth and 
changes in inequality represent two mechanisms for reducing poverty.  These calculations 
also emphasize the importance of identifying policies that not only boost aggregate 
growth but that are also pro-poor, in that they disproportionately benefit the poor. 
The recent empirical growth literature has focused on policies that foster average   3
GDP per capita.
1 However, growth-enhancing policies can have distributional effects; 
they can raise average income by (i) raising everyone’s income, (ii) raising primarily 
incomes of the rich, or (iii) raising primarily incomes of the poor. If pro-growth policies 
are also pro-poor, their poverty alleviation impact can be much greater. This paper 
focuses on one specific policy area – financial intermediary development – and its effect 
on income inequality and poverty alleviation.   
A burgeoning empirical literature over the last decade finds that financial 
development exerts a first-order impact on long-term economic growth.  But does the 
whole population participate in the benefits of financial development or are these benefits 
limited to a select few?  While some theories hold that financial intermediaries help 
extend access to financial services, thus assisting firms to overcome indivisible 
investment constraints and fostering competition and equality, others posit that it is the 
rich who stand to benefit most from financial deepening.   
Using a broad sample of 52 developing and developed countries, with data 
averaged over the period 1960 to 1999, this paper assesses whether there is a direct 
relationship between financial intermediary development and changes in income 
distribution.  This relationship is crucial in understanding the linkage between financial 
development and poverty alleviation since poverty reduction in any given country is 
determined by the growth of mean income and changes in income distribution.  Given 
that there is already significant evidence that financial development is pro-growth, we 
seek to determine whether financial development is also pro-poor.  By pro-poor, we mean 
does financial development significantly improve income distribution by 
disproportionately boosting the incomes of the poor?  To capture changes in income 
                                                 
1 See, the Handbook of Economic Growth (Aghion and Durlauf, 2005).   4
distribution, we use the growth rates of  (i) income of the poorest quintile, (ii) the Gini 
coefficient, and (iii) the standard deviation of income distribution.  To test whether 
financial development boosts income growth of the poor more than the average, we 
examine the relationship between finance and income growth of the poor while 
controlling for average income growth. 
Our results indicate that finance is pro-poor.  The income of the poorest quintile 
grows faster than average GDP per capita in countries with better-developed financial 
intermediaries. Income inequality, measured both by the Gini coefficient and the standard 
deviation, falls more rapidly in countries with higher levels of financial intermediary 
development.  These results are robust to controlling for endogeneity.  
Finally, as a robustness test we also investigate the direct relationship between 
financial intermediary development and two indicators of social improvement.  We are 
able to replicate our results when we look at infant mortality. Countries with better-
developed financial intermediaries have seen larger reductions in infant mortality.  This 
relationship is robust to controlling for endogeneity. When we examine school enrollment 
rates, we find a strong, positive relationship between financial intermediary development 
and increases in child enrollment in primary schools, but this relationship becomes 
insignificant when using instrumental variables. 
Our paper is related to a small, but growing literature assessing the determinants 
of income inequality, including Li, Squire and Zou (1998), Li, Xu and Zou (1999), 
Gallup, Radelet and Warner (1998), Lundberg and Squire (2003), Foster and Szekely 
(2001) and Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003).   Particularly relevant is Clarke et al. (2003).  
They assess the relationship between financial intermediary development and levels of   5
income inequality.  Unlike them, however, we consider the relationship between financial 
intermediaries and the changes in inequality, and thus link our analysis directly to income 
growth of the poor and poverty alleviation.  Our paper is also related to Honohan (2004a, 
b) who considers the relationship between financial development and levels of absolute 
poverty. 
Our paper is also related to recent work that analyzes the link between financial 
development and child labor.  In a cross-country sample, Dehejia and Gatti (2002) find 
that the incidence of child labor is lower in countries with greater financial depth and that 
financial deepening dampens the impact of income volatility on child labor. Similarly, 
using a panel dataset of Tanzanian households, Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) find that 
child labor is used to buffer transitory income shocks less when households have access 
to credit. Jacoby (1994) shows for a sample of Peruvian households that greater 
borrowing constraints reduce primary school attendance.   
While our results are robust to different specifications, our analysis faces several 
limitations.  First, we use cross-country regressions, so the results are subject to the usual 
criticisms of cross-country studies (Levine and Zervos, 1993): some observers hold that 
countries are so different that they cannot be viewed as being drawn from the same 
population and therefore reject the validity of cross-country regressions; others stress that 
averaging data over time eliminates time-series information and does not allow one to 
adequately control for country-specific effects. Second, our indicator of financial 
intermediary development is an aggregate measure that captures the amount of savings 
intermediated to private borrowers relative to GDP. It does not measure the degree to 
which the population in general or the poor in particular access financial services.  We   6
see our analysis, therefore, as a first step before better data on access to financial services 
is constructed.  Third, income distribution is measured with error (Lundberg and Squire, 
2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, this would bias our regressions against finding 
any significant relationships.  Finally, while our results show the importance of financial 
intermediaries for the poor, they are silent on how to foster financial intermediary 
development and to broaden access to financial services, which is the focus of a 
companion literature.
2  Future work needs to examine the link between particular policies 
toward the financial sector and the pro-poor nature of financial intermediation.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses different 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between financial intermediary development and 
changes in income distribution and poverty.  Section III presents the data and 
methodology. Section IV presents the results and section V concludes. 
 
II.    Existing Literature 
The finance and growth literature has focused on the relationship between 
financial development and aggregate economic growth of societies, as proxied mostly by 
the growth rate of real per capita GDP.  Less effort has been expended on studying the 
differential effects of finance on different segments of societies.  Financial development, 
however, might have distributional effects.  Specifically, consider the income of the 
lowest income quintile, yP, which can be written as a function of average GDP per capita 
y and the Lorenz curve L, which relates the share of the population to the share of income 
received:  
                                                 
2 For instance, on bank supervision, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine 2004a,b; Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 2005; and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine 2004).   7
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While the term in the first parenthesis on the right hand side captures the overall growth 
component, the term in the second parenthesis captures the distributional component of 
income changes in the lowest income quintile.  While the finance and growth literature 
has extensively analyzed the relationship between financial development and this first 
component, considerably less effort has been expended analyzing the effect of finance on 
the distributional component.     
The relationship between finance and income inequality is also relevant for 
reducing absolute poverty. An arithmetic identity links average growth and changes in 
income distribution with poverty alleviation (Bourguignon, 2004): 
)] ( ), [( 1 1 1 − − − − − = − t t t t t t L L y y Fn P P  
where P is an indicator of poverty incidence. What has come to be known as the Poverty-
Growth-Inequality Triangle illustrates that poverty reduction in an economy is 
determined by the rate of growth and changes in income distribution.  
Theory provides different hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
financial deepening and movements in relative income shares.  Some theories claim that 
financial intermediary development is pro-poor. Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and 
Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) show that credit constraints are particularly 
binding on the poor.  These credit constraints, therefore, represent a particularly high 
barrier to the ability of the poor to exploit investment opportunities. This produces higher 
income inequality in economies with higher credit constraints, i.e., in economies with   8
lower levels of financial development. By allowing more entrepreneurs access to external 
finance, financial intermediary development enables them to overcome the barriers of 
indivisible investments (McKinnon, 1973).  Financial intermediaries are especially 
important for small and opaque firms, since effective and developed intermediaries are in 
a better position to overcome problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995). On a more general level, political theories of financial 
deepening posit that deeper and more competitive financial markets enable access of 
larger parts of the population beyond the incumbents and the rich (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003). Developed, competitive financial intermediaries foster economy-wide competition 
and openness by (i) facilitating the entry of new enterprises and (ii) reducing the 
dependence of new entrants on personal wealth and political connections.  
For financial intermediaries to have a positive impact on income distribution, not 
all income groups have to have equal access to credit.  First, it is important to distinguish 
between the need for financial services, and demand, which by definition should 
guarantee a reasonable return for financial intermediaries at a market-based and risk-
adjusted price.  Second, just because the loan is made to a rich or wealthy person does not 
mean it will worsen income distribution, especially if the loan resources are put to the 
most productive use and other markets – input and output markets – are competitive. 
Rather, it is important that financial services are accessible for most productive uses, 
independent of initial wealth and political and business connections.  
Other theories question whether financial services become more accessible as 
financial markets deepen and hold that it is mostly the incumbents and connected who 
benefit from financial deepening.  Especially at early stages of financial deepening,   9
access to financial services, especially credit, is limited to wealthy incumbents and 
politically connected (Lamoreaux, 1986; Haber 1991; Maurer and Haber, 2003) and will 
thus raise their incomes relative to the incomes of the poor.  While financial 
intermediaries have an important role in mobilizing savings and fostering capital 
accumulation, in this case resources are not allocated to their most productive use. In 
countries with powerful governing elites, financial deepening will therefore lead to less 
rather than more competitiveness and primarily help rich insiders at the expense of the 
lower and middle-income groups.  
Other models, still, posit a non-linear relationship between finance and income 
distribution. Building on the Kuznets hypothesis, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show 
how the interaction of financial and economic development can give rise to an inverted 
U-shaped curve of income inequality and financial intermediary development.  While at 
an early stage of financial development, it is only the rich who have access to financial 
markets and thus the opportunity to invest in high-risk, high-return projects, over time, 
access will expand to poorer segments of the population.  The distribution effect of 
financial deepening is thus adverse for the poor at early stages, but positive after a turning 
point.    
Given the poverty-growth-inequality identity and the literature on finance and 
growth, if our results show that financial development benefits the poor or has no 
significant impact on the relative income of the poor, then it would be possible to 
conclude that financial development reduces poverty.  If, however, our results indicate 
that financial development negatively affects income distribution, the impact of finance 
on poverty alleviation is less clear.  We will test these hypotheses below.   10
 
III. Data  and  Methodology 
This section describes the variables and the methodology we will be using to 
assess the relationship between financial intermediary development and poverty 
alleviation.   
A.  Indicator of Financial Intermediary Development 
To evaluate the impact of financial intermediaries on changes in income 
distribution, we seek an indicator of the ability of financial intermediaries to research and 
identify profitable ventures, monitor and control managers, ease risk management, and 
facilitate resource mobilization.  Ideally, we would like to have an indicator that captures 
both the depth and the breadth of financial intermediation in a society. We do not have a 
direct measure of these financial services, especially not of the access to and thus breadth 
of financial services.  We therefore rely on a traditional measure of financial intermediary 
development that has been used extensively in the finance and growth literature.  
PRIVATE CREDIT equals the value of credit by financial intermediaries to the 
private sector divided by GDP.  This measure excludes credits issued by the central bank 
and development banks.  Furthermore, it excludes credit to the public sector and cross 
claims of one group of intermediaries on another.    PRIVATE CREDIT is thus a 
comparatively comprehensive measure of credit issuing intermediaries since it includes 
the credits of financial intermediaries that are not considered deposit money banks.  
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show a robust 
causal link from Private Credit to GDP per capita and productivity per capita growth. Our 
data on Private Credit are from the updated version of the Financial Structure Database   11
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). There is a wide variation in financial 
intermediary development across countries, ranging from 5% in Sierra Leone to 149% in 
Hong Kong, as averaged over the period 1960-99. 
B. Indicators of income distribution and poverty alleviation 
We use the income share of the lowest income quintile, the Gini coefficient and 
the standard deviation of the income shares as indicators of income distribution.
3  While 
the income share of the lowest income quintile is a more limited indicator of income 
distribution than the Gini coefficient and the standard deviation, which capture the whole 
Lorenz curve, empirically the log of the income share of the lowest income quintile is an 
almost exactly linear function of the Gini coefficient (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). 
Our data on the Gini coefficient, its standard deviation, and the income share of 
the lowest income quintile are from Dollar and Kraay who construct these data from 
various sources.  We also use their estimates for GDP per capita growth from the 
extended version of the Summers-Heston Penn World Tables 5.6.  Unlike Dollar and 
Kraay, we estimate pure cross-country regressions, impose the restriction that there is at 
least 20 years difference between the first and last observation on the income share, and 
thus we have one observation per country, rather than a panel.  We therefore use the first 
and last observation from the Dollar and Kraay database, mostly from the 1960s and 
1990s respectively, and use data on GDP per capita growth and Private Credit for the 
same time period. Given the different data restrictions, our final sample consists of 52 
                                                 
3 The Gini coefficient is defined as the ratio of area between the Lorenz curve, which plots the share of 
population against income share received, and the diagonal to the area below the diagonal.  Assuming that 
the income distribution is lognormal, its standard deviation is given by σ= (2)
0.5 *Φ
-1[(1+G/100)/2] where G 
denotes the Gini coefficient and  Φ  the cumulative normal distribution function (Dollar and Kraay, 2002 
and Besley and Burgess, 2003). The income share of the lowest income quintile is then given  by Φ(Φ
-1 
(0.2) - σ).   12
developing and developed countries, for which we present data on all variables of interest 
in Table 1.  
As can be seen from Table 1, there is a wide variation in the change of income 
distribution within our sample, measured by all three indicators of income distribution.
4 
The annual growth rate of lowest income quintile, averaged over the period 1960-99, 
ranges from –7.7 percent in Sierra Leone to 6.6 percent in Korea.  The Gini coefficient 
and standard deviation of the income distribution decreased by 2 percent, on an annual 
basis, in Finland, but increased by more than one percent annually, in Ecuador, during the 
same time period.  
As robustness test, we also explore if financial intermediary development has a 
direct effect on social indicators. We use changes in infant mortality to proxy for 
improvement in social services.  We have data available for 99 countries over the period 
1960 to 1999.  The largest change in infant mortality was in Korea, a reduction of 7 
percent on an annual basis, with the lowest being almost zero in Nigeria and Zambia. We 
use the primary net enrollment rate to measure human capital accumulation at its most 
basic level.
5 Data for net enrollment are available for 1970 to 1999.
6  Primary net 
enrollment decreased by 2.6 percent, on an annual basis, in Congo Democratic Republic 
and increased by almost 4.5 percent, on an annual basis, in Burkina Faso. 
C. Descriptive statistics and correlations        
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and Panel B presents correlations 
                                                 
4 Levels of inequality and social indicators are given in the appendix Table A1. 
5 We use net rather than gross enrollment rates, since the latter also includes adults.  By focusing on child 
enrollment rates, we can link our results closer to the micro literature considering the effect of credit 
constraints on child labor and school attendance [Dehejia and Gatti, 2002; Beegle, Dehjia and Gatti, 2003; 
and Jacoby, 1994]. 
6 For both infant mortality and net enrollment rate, we impose a minimum requirement of 20 years between 
initial and final value to include the country in the sample.    13
between the different measures of changes in income distribution and social indicators 
and Private Credit.  Consistent with earlier work, financial intermediary development is 
positive and significantly correlated with GDP per capita growth rate.  It is also positively 
and significantly correlated with the income growth of the poor and reductions in income 
inequality, both measured by Gini and the standard deviation.  Looking at changes in 
social indicators, financial development is significantly correlated with reductions in 
infant mortality. However, surprisingly, Private Credit is also negatively correlated with 
the growth in primary net enrollment, although only at the 10% significance level. GDP 
per capita growth, the income growth of the poor and reductions in infant mortality are 
also significantly correlated with each other, while changes in net enrollment are only 




We first evaluate the impact of financial development on income growth of the 
poorest income quintile. To do this, we average available data over the period 1960-99 
and utilize the following regression: 
, / ) ( , , , , , , i i i n t p i n t p i t p i X FD y n y y ε γ β α + + + = − − −    (1) 
where yi,p,t is the log of real GPD per capita of the poorest income quintile in country i in 
year t, FD is Private Credit and X is a set of conditioning information.
 8 The time period n 
is at least 20 years, which reduces our sample to 52 countries.  We follow previous 
                                                 
7 One explanation may be the highly positive and significant correlation between infant mortality and 
population growth rates. Higher population growth is also associated with higher enrollment growth. Where 
child labor is common, having more siblings may increase the odds of each child’s primary school 
enrollment. 
8 In line with the finance and growth literature we include Private Credit in logs to control for non-
linearities in the relationship.   14
studies on the finance-growth relationship and control for educational attainment, 
macroeconomic policies and indicators of trade openness. Specifically, we control for the 
average years of schooling as indicator of the human capital stock in the economy, the 
inflation rate and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as indicators of 
macroeconomic stability, and the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP to 
capture the degree of openness of an economy. 
The coefficient β in regression equation (1) captures both the growth and the 
distributional effect of financial intermediary development on the income growth of the 
poorest income quintile.  This regression set-up does not allow us to assess how much of 
the effect of Private Credit is due to its positive effect on overall GDP per capita growth 
and how much is due to distributional effects that changes incomes of the poorest income 
quintile relative to other income quintiles.  To better understand the distributional effect 
of financial intermediary development, we do the following.  First, following Dollar and 
Kraay (2002), we regress the growth rate of GDP per capita for the poorest quintile on 
real GDP per capita growth for the whole population and Private Credit.  
  , / ) ( / ) ( , , , , , , , , i i n t i t i n t p i n t p i t p i FD n y y y n y y ε γ β α + + − + = − − − −  (2) 
The coefficient β indicates whether the income of the poorest quintile grows 
proportionally with overall income growth in the economy, while γ indicates whether 
there is any differential effect of Private Credit on income growth of the poorest quintile 
beyond any impact on overall income growth. A positive (negative) γ indicates the 
poorest quintile benefits more (less) than proportionally from Private Credit.     
  Regression equation (2) assesses how the poorest quintile’s income share varies 
with Private Credit.  As alternative measures of distributional change, we examine the   15
relationship between financial intermediary development and (i) changes in the Gini 
coefficient and (ii) changes in the standard deviation of income distribution, which are 
more general measures of income distribution: 
, / ) ( / ) ( , , , , , i n t i i n t i t i n t i t i G FD n y y n G G ε λ β α + + + − = − − − −  (3) 
where Gi,tt is either the log of the Gini coefficient or the log of the standard deviation of 
the income distribution of country i in period t. As before, the time period n is at least 20 
years.  As in regression (2), we include the GDP per capita growth rate to (a) separate the 
distributional effect of Private Credit from the aggregate growth effect and (b) control for 
any effect that GDP per capita growth has on income distribution (Bourguignon, 2001). 
To explore the impact of financial intermediary development on social 
improvements, specifically reductions in infant mortality and increases in primary net 
enrollment rates, we regress the log difference of these variables on their initial value, 
growth of GDP per capita and Private Credit 
, / ) ( / ) ( , , , , , i n t i i n t i t i n t i t i S FD n y y n S S ε λ β α + + + − = − − − −  (4) 
where Si, t is the log of the respective indicator in country i in year t. Again, by controlling 
for GDP per capita growth, we identify the distributional effect of Private Credit.  Given 
the different frequency of the social indicators, the regressions are run over different time 
periods. In either case, however, n is at least 20 years.  We also considered using 
indicators of absolute poverty such as headcount and poverty gap based on the one-
dollar-a-day criterion.  These are problematic, however, because time-series dimension of 
these data are extremely limited and because these headcount and poverty gap indicators 
measure extreme destitution, which also results in high and upper-middle income 
countries dropping out of the sample (Pritchett, 2003).  Thus, we mainly focus on   16
measuring the growth rate of the incomes of the poorest quintile of society and changes 
in income distribution. 
E. Simultaneity Bias 
To assess the relationship between financial intermediary development and 
income distribution, we use both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Instrumental Variable 
(IV) regressions.  The results of the OLS regressions might be biased due to reverse 
causation and simultaneity bias.
9 To assess the robustness of the results, we therefore use 
IV regressions and extract the exogenous component of financial intermediary 
development.  Following the finance and growth literature, we use the legal origin of 
countries, the absolute value of the latitude of the capital city and the religious 
composition of the population as instrumental variables.  Previous research has 
demonstrated the correlation of financial intermediary development with a country’s legal 
tradition, initial endowment and dominant religion [La Porta et al. (1997), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) and Stulz and Williamson (2003)]. 
To test the appropriateness of the instruments, we use two tests. First, to test 
whether the instrumental variables are valid, we use the Hansen test of the 
overidentifying restrictions (OIR), which assesses whether the instrumental variables are 
associated with the dependent variable beyond their ability to explain cross-country 
variation in Private Credit. Under the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments 
(i.e., the instruments not included in the second stage regression) are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation, the Hansen test is distributed χ
2 in the number of 
                                                 
9 Honohan (2004a,b), however, argues that reverse causation should be much less of a problem in the case 
of income growth of the poor than overall GDP per capita growth.   17
overidentifying restrictions.  Second, we test for the joint significance of the instruments 
in the first stage regressions to assess whether the instruments explain variation in 
financial development.  
 
IV. Empirical  results 
A. The distributional effect of finance 
The results in Table 3 suggest that finance is pro-poor. Private Credit has a 
positive impact on the income growth of the poor, even after controlling for the overall 
income growth.  This relationship is robust to controlling for a large number of other 
growth determinants and controlling for endogeneity.  Consider first the results in 
columns 1 and 2.  Here we regress the average annual growth rate of income of the 
poorest quintile on Private Credit and an array of conditioning information variables.  
These regressions are similar to regressions utilized in previous studies, but use income 
growth of the poorest income quintile rather than the overall income growth rate as the 
dependent variable. The results suggest that the income of the poorest quintile grows 
faster in countries with better-developed financial intermediaries.  Using legal origin, 
latitude and religion to extract the exogenous component of Private Credit, the results in 
column 2 show that this relationship is not due to reverse causation or simultaneity bias.   
The specification tests do not reject the validity of the instruments; they jointly enter 
significantly in the first-stage regressions and the test of OIR is not rejected, indicating 
that the instrumental variables are not related to the income growth of the poor beyond 
their influence through financial intermediary development or the other explanatory 
variables.     18
Financial intermediary development benefits the poorest income quintile 
relatively more than the overall population, as indicated by the results in columns 3 and 
4. While the results in columns 1 and 2 do not allow us to distinguish the growth effect of 
financial intermediary development (which has been established by previous studies) 
from the distributional effect, the regressions in columns 3 and 4 separate the growth and 
distributional effects. They do this by regressing the growth rate of the poorest income 
quintile on the overall GDP per capita growth rate and Private Credit.  The coefficient on 
Private Credit thus captures any differential - distributional - effect of financial 
intermediary development on the poorest income quintile beyond its overall growth 
effect.  The positive and significant coefficient indicates a distributional effect of Private 
Credit favoring the lowest income quintile.  As indicated by the results in column 4, 
where we instrument for Private Credit with legal origin, latitude and religion, this result 
is also robust to controlling for endogeneity.
10   
  The distributional effect of Private Credit is not only statistically significant but 
also economically relevant. Comparing the coefficients on Private Credit in columns 1 
and 3 and columns 2 and 4 suggests that the distributional effect of Private Credit is more 
than half of the overall effect of Private Credit on the income growth of the poorest 
quintile.  The results suggest that average income of the poor in Brazil would have grown 
2% instead of 0% annually over the period 1960-99 if Brazil had the same level of 
                                                 
10 As robustness test, we also tested whether the effect of financial intermediary development varies with 
the initial income of the poor.  While the interaction term of Private Credit with the log of initial income 
enters negatively, it is not significant; and the overall effect of Private Credit is significant and positive at 
all levels of initial income of the poor.  Furthermore, while the point estimate of the impact of Private 
Credit seems to decline with increases in initial income, we cannot reject the hypothesis that Private Credit 
has the same coefficient at different income levels.   19
financial intermediary development as Korea.
 11 Given that Brazil’s GDP per capita grew 
2% over the same period, the poor would have experienced similar income growth as the 
rest of the country. The effect is even stronger for the IV regression. 
Turning to the control variables, we note that Private Credit is the only variable 
entering significantly in both columns 1 and 2.  We find a convergence effect in columns 
3 and 4, the log of initial income of the poor enters significantly and negatively in both 
OLS and IV regressions.  Growth of GDP per capita, on the other hand, enters 
significantly in the OLS, but not in the IV regression. 
The results in Table 4 confirm the positive distributional effect of Private Credit. 
Here the dependent variable is either the change in the Gini coefficient or the change in 
the standard deviation of the income distribution. We regress these on both GDP per 
capita growth and Private Credit.  Plus, in the change in Gini regression we include the 
initial Gini value; and in the change in the standard deviation of the income distribution 
regression, we include the initial standard deviation value. Private Credit enters 
significantly and negatively in all regressions.
12  Again, the relationship between the 
change in Gini (and the change in the standard deviation of income distribution) and 
Private Credit is robust to controlling for endogeneity; Private Credit enters significantly 
in the IV regressions and the OIR is not rejected.   
Finally, we note that there is a convergence effect in income inequality. Higher 
initial inequality is associated with a decline in inequality in all regressions.  We do not 
see any evidence of growth reducing income inequality, since growth of GDP per capita 
                                                 
11 To get this, recall that the regressors are in logs and note that the ln(0.740) - ln(0.276) = 0.99.  
Multiplying this with the coefficient in column 3, yields 0.016.  
12 We also tested for non-linearities by including the squared term of Private Credit, but it never entered 
significantly.   20
does not enter significantly in most regressions.  
The results in Tables 3 and 4 establish that financial intermediary development 
has a positive distributional effect with positive ramifications on poverty alleviation.  
Given the poverty-growth-inequality identity, the finding that financial development 
improves income distribution clearly indicates that finance is not only pro-growth, but 
also pro-poor. 
B. The social effect of finance 
Finally, as a robustness check, we assess the direct link between financial 
intermediary development and two social indicators.  The goal is to use alternative 
indicators – besides income and inequality measures -- of whether the poor are benefiting 
from financial development. First and foremost we use infant mortality.  The underlying 
assumption is that the poor will spend some of their increased prosperity on reducing the 
risk of infant mortality.  The results in Table 5 indicate that financial deepening is 
associated with reductions in infant mortality. Private Credit enters significantly and 
negatively both in the OLS and the IV regressions of the growth in infant mortality. 
Further, the OIR test is not rejected suggesting that the association of Private Credit with 
reductions in infant mortality is not due to reverse causation.  Second, we examine 
primary school enrollment rates.  Here, the underlying assumption is that the poor will 
spend some of their increased prosperity on schooling for their children. This indicator is 
more suspect than infant mortality because (i) the link between income and saving one’s 
children seems stronger than the link between income and sending one’s children for 
formal education and (ii) public policies toward schooling will dramatically alter the 
availability of schools.  While Private Credit enters significantly in the OLS regression of   21
the net primary enrollment rate, it does not enter significantly in the IV regression, 
suggesting that while net enrollment in primary schools has increased over the past 30 
years in economies with stronger financial intermediaries, there is no robust evidence for 
a causal relationship.
13   
 
V. Conclusions 
  An extensive literature has already shown that financial development is pro-
growth.  Using a broad sample for 52 countries, with data averaged over the period 1960 
to 1999, this paper assesses whether financial intermediary development is also pro-poor.  
To be classified as “pro-poor,” we require that financial development not only exerts a 
positive impact on income distribution.  In other words, financial development should 
either raise everyone’s income equally or it should raise the incomes of the poor 
disproportionately more than the rich. 
  The results of this paper indicate that financial intermediary development is 
indeed pro-poor.  Using credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by 
GDP - a measure of financial intermediary development common in the finance and 
growth literature- we see that in countries with better developed financial intermediaries, 
the income of the lowest quintile grows faster than average GDP per capita and income 
inequality falls more rapidly.  Since past work indicates that finance has a positive impact 
on long-run economic growth, this paper’s additional finding that it also affects income 
distribution favorably establishes that financial development is pro-poor. 
Our results show the importance of financial intermediaries for the poor, but they 
                                                 
13 This a similar finding as in Easterly (1999) who fails to find a causal relationship between economic 
growth and many quality of life indicators.   22
do not suggest how to foster financial intermediary development or how to broaden 
access to financial services.  A large and growing literature has discussed policies to 
foster financial intermediary development. But future work will need to identify which 
policies lead to pro-poor financial intermediary development that expands  access to 
financial services and products.        
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Financial Development and Growth in Inequality and Social Indicators 
 
GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US$. GR_POOR is the growth rate of the poor over the period 1960-1999. GINI COEFFICIENT is the growth in Gini coefficient over the period 1960-99. 
STANDARD DEVIATION is the growth in standard deviation of the income distribution averaged over the period 1960-99. PRIMARY ENROLMENT is the growth in net primary school enrolment 
averaged over 1960-99. INFANT MORTALITY is the growth in mortality rate for infants, per 1000 live births. PRIVATE CREDIT is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of 
GDP. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 
 










Australia  15957 0.020  0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.035 0.395 
Bahamas,  The  11723 0.018 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.031 0.461 
Bangladesh  267  0.015  0.002 0.002 0.020 -0.025 0.208 
Bolivia  915  0.010  -0.005 -0.006 0.011 -0.022 0.194 
Brazil  3411 0.003  0.007 0.009 0.011 -0.032 0.276 
Canada  16549 0.020  0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.042 0.563 
Chile  2885 0.011  0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.059 0.337 
Colombia  1753 0.021  0.000 0.000 0.021 -0.035 0.234 
Costa  Rica  2747 -0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.047 0.208 
Denmark  27157 0.027  0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.041 0.439 
Dominican  Republic 1201 -0.002  0.009 0.010 0.049 -0.022 0.203 
Ecuador  9391 0.003  0.011 0.012 0.006 -0.036 0.206 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  715  0.042  -0.010  -0.009  0.013  -0.041  0.266 
El  Salvador  1561 -0.012  0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.033 0.072 
Finland  19636 0.057  -0.018 -0.019 0.002 -0.043 0.514 
France  20433 0.044  -0.010 -0.010 0.001 -0.046 0.760 
Germany  25399 0.018  0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.052 0.816 
Greece 9104  0.022  0.003  0.003 0.000 -0.050 0.312 
Guyana  823  -0.001  -0.006 -0.007 0.004 -0.015 0.336 
Honduras  651  0.013  -0.003 -0.003 0.011 -0.036 0.252 
Hong Kong, China  12311  0.052  0.005  0.006  0.001  -0.066  1.491 
India  262  0.022  -0.004  -0.005 . -0.019  0.197 
Indonesia  550  0.044  -0.002 -0.002 0.010 -0.032 0.295 
Jamaica  2126  0.015  -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.030 0.239   27










Japan  27798 0.055  -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.056 1.197 
Korea,  Rep.  5087 0.066  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.071 0.740 
Madagascar  319  -0.017  -0.002 -0.003 0.022 -0.007 0.162 
Malaysia  2381 0.041  0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.056 0.574 
Mexico  2773 0.012  0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.033 0.211 
Netherlands  20499 0.035  -0.009 -0.009 0.002 -0.032 0.912 
Niger  310 -0.013  0.007 0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.113 
Nigeria 256  -0.005  0.003  0.003  .  -0.003  0.107 
Norway  22932 0.052  -0.012 -0.012 0.005 -0.039 0.737 
Pakistan 340  0.028  0.000  0.000  .  -0.012  0.214 
Panama  2857 -0.023  0.010 0.012 0.009 -0.027 0.456 
Peru  2300  0.001  -0.006 -0.007 0.010 -0.038 0.151 
Philippines  994  0.016  0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.031 0.296 
Portugal  7184  0.039  -0.006 -0.007 0.011 -0.066 0.686 
Senegal  592 -0.005  0.002 0.003 0.027 -0.019 0.257 
Sierra Leone  296  -0.077  0.006  0.008  .  -0.005  0.047 
Singapore  11847 0.052  0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.062 0.780 
Spain  10755 0.032  -0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.061 0.798 
Sri  Lanka  487  0.034  -0.005  -0.006 . -0.040  0.154 
Sweden  22135 0.033  -0.009 -0.010 0.001 -0.041 0.909 
Thailand 1347  0.031  0.004  0.005  .  -0.035  0.524 
Trinidad and Tobago  3664  0.021  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.032  0.305 
Tunisia  1507  0.036  -0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.047 0.591 
Turkey  2256  0.029  -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.038 0.158 
United  Kingdom  14671 0.014  0.008 0.009 0.001 -0.035 0.567 
United  States  21202 0.011  0.009 0.010 0.002 -0.033 0.826 
Venezuela  3845 0.001  0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.026 0.230 
Zambia 575  -0.027  0.004  0.005  -0.008  -0.003  0.062 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the correlations. GR_GCAP is growth in real GDP per capita in US$. GR_POOR is the growth rate of the poor over 1960-1999. INFANT 
MORTALITY is the growth in mortality rate for infants, per 1000 live births.  GINI COEFFICIENT is the growth in Gini coefficient over the period 1960-1999. PRIMARY ENROLMENT is the 
growth in net primary school enrolment over 1960-99. STANDARD DEVIATION is the growth in standard deviation of the income distribution  over the period 1960-99. PRIVATE CREDIT is claims 
of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. The descriptive statistics and correlations are calculated for growth rates in each of the variables, except PRIVATE CREDIT, which is 
the log of the average value over the period 1960-99. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: 
Variable N  Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
PRIVATE CREDIT  52  0.425  0.307  0.047  1.491 
GR_POOR 52  0.018  0.025  -0.077  0.066 
GINI COEFFICIENT  52  -0.000  0.006  -0.018  0.011 
GR_GCAP 52  0.020  0.017  -0.021  0.067 
INFANT MORTALITY  99  -0.031  0.017  -0.072  -0.003 
PRIMARY ENROLMENT  65  0.007  0.011  -0.026  0.045 
STANDARD DEVIATION  52  -0.000  0.007  -0.019  0.012 
          
 
Panel B: 
   PRIVATE 
CREDIT  GR_POOR  GINI 





GR_POOR  0.7275***          
GINI COEFFICIENT  -0.2347* -0.4908***         
GR_GCAP  0.6689*** 0.8051***  -0.0721 
    
INFANT MORTALITY  -0.7023*** -0.7189***  0.1855  -0.7852***     
PRIMARY ENROLMENT  -0.2606* -0.2375  0.1395  -0.2177  0.3106***   
STANDARD DEVIATION  -0.2430* -0.5000*** 0.9970***  -0.0710  0.1910  0.1530 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  29
 
Table 3  
Finance and Income Growth of the Poor  
 
Specifications (1) and (3) are OLS regressions while specifications (2) and (4) are IV regressions. In specification (1), the regression 
equation estimated is GR_POOR=α0 + β1 INITIAL VALUE + β2 EXPEN +β3  TRADE+  β4INFLATION + β5SCHOOL60 + 
β6PRIVATE CREDIT. In specification (3), the regression equation estimated is GR_POOR =α0 + β1 GR_GCAP + β2INITIAL 
VALUE + β3PRIVATE CREDIT. GR_POOR is the growth rate of the poor. GR_GCAP is the growth rate of real GDP per capita.   
EXPEN is the general govt. final expenditure as a % of GDP. INFLATION is the log difference of the CPI. TRADE is share of 
exports and imports in GDP. SCHOOL60 is the secondary school attainment from the Barro-Lee dataset in the year 1960. INITIAL 
VALUE is the initial GDP per capita of the poor. PRIVATE CREDIT is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a 
share of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
In specification (2) and (4), the first stage regression equation is PRIVATE CREDIT=α0 + β1 COMMON + β2 FRENCH+β3 
GERMAN+  β4LATITUDE+  β5  CATHOLIC+β6 MUSLIM+β7  ORELIG. COMMON, FRENCH and GERMAN legal origin are 
dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. LATITUDE is the capital’s latitude in 
absolute terms. CATHOLIC is percentage of Catholics. MUSLIM is the percentage of Muslims. ORELIG is percentage of other 
religions in the country. The second stage regression estimated in (2) is the same as the regression in (1) : GR_POOR=α0 + β1 
INITIAL VALUE + β2 EXPEN +β3  TRADE+  β4INFLATION + β5SCHOOL60 + β6  (predicted values of) PRIVATE CREDIT. 
Predicted values of PRIVATE CREDIT are used from the first stage. The second stage regression estimated in (4)  is the same as the 
regression in (3) : GR_POOR =α0 + β1 GR_GCAP + β2INITIAL VALUE + β3 (predicted values of) PRIVATE CREDIT.  Predicted 
values of PRIVATE CREDIT are used from the first stage. Log values of all right hand side variables are used.  Specifications (2) and 
(4) also report the F-test for the instruments used, the OIR test and the adjusted R-squared from the first stage. The null hypothesis of 
the OIR test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  
 
  1  2 3 4 
   GR_POOR  GR_POOR  GR_POOR  GR_POOR 
Constant 0.130*  0.153*  0.043***  0.126* 
  [0.075]  [0.084] (0.016) (0.065) 
INITIAL VALUE  -0.007  -0.011**  -0.005**  -0.014* 
  [0.004]  [0.005] (0.002) (0.008) 
GR_GCAP     0.777***  0.253 
     (0.119)  (0.416) 
PRIVATE CREDIT  0.031***  0.044***  0.016***  0.038** 
  [0.006]  [0.009] (0.005) (0.017) 
EXPEN -0.008  -0.008     
 [0.007]  [0.010]     
TRADE -0.005  -0.005     
 [0.015]  [0.015]     
INFL 0.001  0.004     
 [0.003]  [0.004]     
SCHOOL60 0  -0.002     
 [0.004]  [0.005]     
       
F-Test   0.002    0.002 
OIR Test    0.361    0.647 
N  47  47 52 52 
R-squared 0.59    0.726   
First Stage 
Adjusted R-squared    0.490    0.665 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
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Table 4  
Finance and Income Distribution 
 
Specifications (1) and (3) are OLS regressions while specifications (2) and (4) are IV regressions. In specification (1) and (3),  the 
regression equation estimated is GINI COEFFICIENT / STANDARD DEVIATION=α0 + β1 GR_GCAP + β2INITIAL VALUE + 
β3PRIVATE CREDIT. GINI COEFFICIENT is the growth in Gini coefficient over the period 1960-1999. STANDARD DEVIATION 
is the growth in standard deviation of the income distribution over the period 1960-99. GR_GCAP is the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. INITIAL VALUE is initial value of the GINI coefficient or the initial value of the standard deviation. PRIVATE CREDIT is 
claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
In specification (2) and (4), the first stage regression equation is PRIVATE CREDIT=α0 + β1 COMMON + β2 FRENCH+β3 
GERMAN+  β4LATITUDE+  β5  CATHOLIC+β6 MUSLIM+β7  ORELIG. COMMON, FRENCH and GERMAN legal origin are 
dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. LATITUDE is the capital’s latitude in 
absolute terms. CATHOLIC is percentage of Catholics. MUSLIM is the percentage of Muslims. ORELIG is percentage of other 
religions in the country. The second stage regression estimated is the same as the regression in (1) and (3): GINI COEFFICIENT / 
STANDARD DEVIATION =α0 + β1 GR_GCAP + β2INITIAL VALUE + β3 (predicted values of) PRIVATE CREDIT.  Predicted 
values of PRIVATE CREDIT are used from the first stage. Log values of all right hand side variables are used. Specifications (2) and 
(4) also report the F-test for the instruments used, the OIR test and the adjusted R-squared from the first stage. The null hypothesis of 
the OIR test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  
 
  1 2 3  4 








Constant 0.041***  0.051***  -0.010***  -0.021*** 
 (0.012)  (0.015)  [0.003]  [0.007] 
INITIAL VALUE  -0.013***  -0.018***  -0.012***  -0.017*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  [0.003]  [0.005] 
GR_GCAP 0.044  0.168*  0.052  0.188* 
 (0.051)  (0.097)  [0.055]  [0.104] 
PRIVATE CREDIT  -0.004***  -0.009***  -0.005***  -0.010*** 
 (0.001)  (0.003)  [0.002]  [0.003] 
      
F-Test    0.002   0.002 
OIR Test    0.123   0.159 
N 52  52  52  52 
R-squared 0.212    0.209   
First Stage 
Adjusted R-squared   0.586   0.586 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively   31
 
Table 5 
Finance and Social Improvements 
 
Specification (1) and (3) are OLS regressions and specification (2) and (4) are IV regressions. In specifications (1) and (3), the 
regression equation estimated is SOCIAL =α0 + β1 GR_GCAP +  β2 INITIAL VALUE+ β3 PRIVATE CREDIT. The dependent 
variable in each panel is the growth rate in the respective indicators: INFANT MORTALITY is the mortality rate for infants, per 1000 
live births.  PRIMARY ENROLMENT is the percentage net primary school enrolment The regressors include the initial values of 
INFANT MORTALITY or PRIMARY ENROLMENT GR_GCAP which is the growth rate of GDP per capita and PRIVATE 
CREDIT, which is the claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Log values of all right hand side 
variables are used. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
In specification (2) and (4), the first stage regression equation is PRIVATE CREDIT=α0 + β1 COMMON + β2 FRENCH+β3 
GERMAN+ β4 LATITUDE+ β5 CATHOLIC + β6 MUSLIM + β7 ORELIG. COMMON, FRENCH and GERMAN legal origin are 
dummies with value one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. LATITUDE is the capital’s latitude in 
absolute terms. CATHOLIC is percentage of Catholics. MUSLIM is the percentage of Muslims. ORELIG is percentage of other 
religions in the country. The second stage regression estimated is the same as the regression in (1) and (3): SOCIAL = α0 + β1 
GR_GCAP + β2 INITIAL VALUE + β3 (predicted values of) PRIVATE CREDIT. Predicted values of PRIVATE CREDIT are used 
from the first stage. Log values of all right hand side variables are used.  Specifications (2) and (4) also report the F-test for the 
instruments used, the OIR test and the adjusted R-squared from the first stage. The null hypothesis of the OIR test is that the 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and 
sources are given in the appendix. 
 
   1  2  3  4 




Constant -0.046***  -0.034***  0.114***  0.110*** 
 [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
GR_GCAP -0.309** -0.072  0.042  0.06 
 [0.137]  [0.128]  [0.037]  [0.046] 
INITIAL VALUE  0.002  -0.005  -0.024***  -0.024*** 
 [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
PRIVATE CREDIT  -0.007**  -0.020***  0.003**  0.002 
 [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
F-Test   0    0 
Overid   0.234    0.356 
Observations 99  99  65  65 
R-squared 0.526    0.796  0.791 
First Stage 
Adjusted R-squared   0.579    0.414 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.    32
 
Appendix  
Table A1. Levels of Income Inequality and Social Indicators 
 
GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US$. GINI COEFFICIENT is the Gini coefficient averaged over the period 1960-99. 
STANDARD DEVIATION is the standard deviation of the income distribution averaged over the period 1960-99. PRIMARY 
ENROLMENT is the net primary school enrolment averaged over 1960-99. INFANT MORTALITY is the mortality rate for infants, 
per 1000 live births. PRIVATE CREDIT is claims of financial institutions on the private sector, as a share of GDP. Detailed variable 














Algeria 1440  . .  91.660  92.965  0.326 
Argentina 6817  .  .  101.649  35.576  0.169 
Australia 15957  36.597  0.586  97.131  12.260  0.395 
Austria 21166  . .  89.061  16.651  0.660 
Bahamas, 11723  45.773  0.823 . 27.333  0.461 
Bahrain 9294  . .  92.797  .  0.443 
Bangladesh 267  33.060  0.587  69.846  117.471  0.208 
Barbados 5841  .  .  92.618  31.012  0.427 
Belgium 20098  .  .  .  15.004  0.301 
Belize 1845  .  .  .  51.118  0.408 
Benin 356  .  .  .  131.753  0.095 
Bolivia 915  47.520  0.872  88.125  112.529  0.194 
Botswana 1691  .  .  82.044  75.847  0.129 
Brazil 3411  58.015  1.037  83.606  72.694  0.276 
Burkina 186  . .  26.477  141.388  0.134 
Burundi 166  . . .  125.318  0.077 
Cameroon 663  .  .  .  111.329  0.190 
Canada 16549  31.551  0.506  .  13.279  0.563 
Central 407  .  .  54.978  135.424  0.069 
Chad 239  .  .  .  138.482  0.074 
Chile 2885  52.053  0.920  88.580  33.825  0.337 
Colombia 1753  53.709  1.003 .  48.129  0.235 
Congo, 274  .  .  53.549  140.129  0.002 
Congo, 736  .  .  .  96.953  0.096 
Costa Rica  2747  46.383  0.839  88.430  33.893  0.208 
Cote D’vorie  862  .  .  .  131.753  0.279 
Cyprus 8789  . .  88.850  .  0.716 
Denmark 27157  35.507  0.588 .  10.603  0.439 
Dominican 1202  47.292  0.842  . 72.059  0.204 
Ecuador 9391  42.160  0.770  91.228  65.541  0.207 
Egypt, 715  38.000  0.734  85.841  116.894  0.266 
El Salvador  1561  50.494  0.909  76.023  79.906  0.072 
Fiji 2059  .  .  .  38.988  0.261 
Finland 19636  29.947  0.546  .  8.142  0.514 
France 20433  38.825  0.695  99.367  12.663  0.760 
Gabon 4314  .  .  .  91.106  0.148 
Gambia, The  352  .  .  51.590  .  0.163 
Germany 25399  30.741  0.523 .  . 0.816 
Ghana 399  .  .  .  92.753  0.051 
Greece 9104  35.398  0.652  93.983 20.388 0.312 
Guatemala 1319 .  . 65.113  90.659  0.141 
Guyana 823  48.190  0.888  90.850  72.824  0.336   33
Haiti 491  .  .  .  127.106  0.085 
Honduras 651  54.488  1.025  .  81.412  0.252 
Hong Kong,China  12311  41.583  0.713  90.862  11.711  1.491 
Iceland 20318  . . .  9.092  0.394 
India 262  32.352  0.619  .  98.959  0.197 
Indonesia 550  33.615  0.624  93.249  81.518  0.295 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1544  .  .  80.904  .  0.268 
Ireland 11582  . .  90.881  14.349  0.503 
Israel 11184  .  .  .  16.920  0.433 
Italy 13850  .  .  99.609  19.395  0.603 
Jamaica 2126  42.252  0.832  93.812  33.082  0.240 
Japan 27798  34.106  0.553  100.152  10.156  1.197 
Jordan 1637  .  .  75.398  .  0.616 
Kenya 296  .  .  81.322  84.471  0.248 
Korea, 5087  33.437  0.558  96.861  29.412  0.740 
Kuwait 21572  . .  65.652  30.123  0.530 
Lesotho 322  . .  69.099  114.412  0.134 
Liberia 620  .  .  .  167.459  0.102 
Luxembourg 28084  .  .  87.062 14.165 0.850 
Madagascar 319  47.763  0.897  . 104.153  0.162 
Malawi 140  .  .  .  163.812  0.106 
Malaysia 2381  49.484  0.871  96.306  31.358  0.574 
Mali 267  .  .  26.074  .  0.132 
Malta 4508  .  .  97.892  17.891  0.531 
Mauritania 455 .  .  .  135.765  0.315 
Mauritius 2755  .  .  92.902  .  0.284 
Mexico 2773  53.977  0.987  99.692  58.259  0.211 
Morocco 1050  .  .  63.648  92.506  0.246 
Nepal 167  .  .  .  136.118  0.105 
Netherlands 20499  29.317 0.554 96.229 9.810 0.912 
New Zealand  14307  .  .  99.093  13.416  0.418 
Nicaragua 691  .  .  74.270  83.753  0.279 
Niger 311  40.200  0.618  .  191.071  0.114 
Nigeria 256  42.983  0.878  .  116.929  0.107 
Norway  22932  33.166 0.608 98.503 9.860 0.737 
Oman 3767  .  .  63.716  77.812  0.309 
Pakistan 340  32.245  0.611  .  108.024  0.214 
Panama 2857  52.937  0.944  90.144  36.812  0.456 
Papua 849  .  .  .  90.459  0.187 
Paraguay 1485  .  .  90.736  45.059  0.161 
Peru 2300  49.274  0.927  91.880  81.990  0.151 
Philippines 994  47.378  0.833  96.802  64.894  0.296 
Portugal 7184  36.353  0.671  96.623  32.790  0.686 
Rwanda 268  . . .  119.894  0.058 
Saudi Arabia  7578  .  .  55.039  80.212  0.459 
Senegal 592  50.467  1.039  .  127.518  0.257 
Sierra Leone  296  61.845  1.207  .  196.177  0.047 
Singapore 11847  40.599  0.675  95.997  13.968  0.780 
South 3989  .  .  92.326  66.082  0.501 
Spain 10755  28.518  0.523  99.851  18.242  0.798 
Sri Lanka  487  39.444  0.666  .  38.067  0.154 
Sudan 234  .  .  .  90.588  0.092 
Swaziland 1238  .  . 85.484 . 0.190   34
Sweden 22135  31.030  0.558  101.099  8.441  0.910 
Switzerland 38324  .  .  .  10.866  1.259 
Syrian 594  .  .  91.308  66.718  0.086 
Thailand 1347  44.625  0.777  .  55.224  0.524 
Togo 364  .  .  77.228  110.400  0.211 
Trinidad 3664  44.529  0.777  91.008  33.689  0.305 
Tunisia 1507  44.250  0.840  93.818  72.166  0.591 
Turkey 2256  50.023  0.887  . .  0.158 
United Kingdom  14671  26.436  0.478  97.601  12.998  0.567 
United States  21202  36.471  0.591  .  14.607  0.826 
Uruguay 4865  .  .  .  31.071  0.237 
Venezuela 3845  44.542  0.748  84.632  33.793  0.300 
Zambia 576  47.702  0.907  .  108.024  0.062 
Zimbabwe 596 .  .  .  73.729  0.233 
   35
 
Table A2: Variable Definitions 
  




GR_POOR                                     GDP per capita growth of the lowest income quintile group      WDI, Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
 
GINI COEFFICIENT                                               Ratio of the area below the Lorenz Curve, which plots share of population against   Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
income share received, to the area below the diagonal. It lies between 0 and 1 and is  
a measure of income inequality. 
 
STANDARD DEVIATION                                             Standard deviation of the income distribution. Assuming that the income distribution is    Dollar and Kraay (2002), Besley and Burgess(2003),       
lognormal, its standard deviation is given by σ= (2)
0.5 *Φ
-1[(1+G/100)/2]     own calculations   
where Φ denotes the cumulative normal distribution function   
 
PRIMARY ENROLMENT      Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age  WDI 
(as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school to the 
population of the corresponding official school age. Based on the International  
Standard Classification of Education, 1976 (ISCED76) and 1997 (ISCED97). 
 
INFANT MORTALITY      Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age,   WDI 
per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
 
Financial Structure and Macro Variables 
 
GDP/CAP                                  GDP per capita(constant 1995 US$)          WDI 
 
GR_GCAP                                  GDP per capita growth(annual %)          WDI 
 
PRIVATE CREDIT                                   Claims on private sector by deposit money banks and other       IFS, own calculations 
financial institutions as share of GDP 
 
SCHOOL60                             Secondary school attainment in the year 1960.        Barro-Lee dataset   
 
EXPEN                                    General Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)      WDI   
  
INFLATION                                 Inflation calculated from CPI            IFS 
  
TRADE                                     Share of imports plus exports in GDP          WDI 
 




LATITUDE                                The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values     La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 





CATHOLIC                                  Catholics as a percentage of population in 1980        La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
MUSLIM                                  Muslims as a percentage of population in 19805         La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
PROTEST                                   Protestants as a percentage of population in 1980        La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
ORELIG                                   Other Religions as a percentage of population in 1980     La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
 
Legal Origin Variables 
 
COMMON                                  Legal Origin -  British        La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
FRENCH                                  Legal origin –  French        La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
GERMAN                                  Legal origin  –  German      La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
SCANDINAV                               Legal origin – Scandinavian       La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
TRANSITION                                  Legal origin  –  Socialist       La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 